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Charter Right or Charter-Lite? 
Administrative Discretion and  
the Charter 
Audrey Macklin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The intersection of the Charter
1
 and administrative discretion is one 
of the more difficult crossroads to navigate in public law. The rules of the 
road keep changing, pointing us in one direction (follow the Oakes test! 
says Multani
2
) then another (go toward administrative law! says Doré
3
). 
It must matter which route we take; otherwise, why would the Supreme 
Court change the rules? Yet, the Supreme Court in Doré also assures us 
that we will arrive at the same destination, whichever path we follow. 
If Doré’s prediction is correct, then perhaps the stakes are more 
doctrinal and methodological than practical, and so mainly of concern to 
academics and commentators. But if it is wrong, then we need to figure 
out whether and how the two approaches might diverge, in order to 
evaluate what is at stake in choosing one method over another. 
II.VALUING CHARTER RIGHTS 
Other contributors to this volume assay the role of Charter values in 
adjudication.
4
 They helpfully distinguish between Charter values and 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law at the University of Toronto and Chair in Human Rights Law. The 
author thanks Paul Daly and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and suggestions. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B  to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].  
2 Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 
256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”], citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
3 Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Doré”]. 
4 Chris Bredt & Ewa Krajewska, “Doré — All That Glitters is Not Gold”; Matthew 
Horner, “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian Constitutionalism”; Lorne Sossin & 
Mark Friedman, “Charter Values and Administrative Justice”, in this volume.  
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Charter rights, valiantly working against the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
own imprecision. Sometimes, Charter values refer to the ideals that 
underlie and animate Charter rights, such as autonomy, human dignity, 
respect for diversity, equality in a broad sense, democratic participation, 
etc. As such, Charter values qua values-underlying-Charter-rights are 
invoked as tools for interpreting the meaning and scope of Charter rights 
themselves. What counts as a Charter value and the meaning ascribed to 
a given Charter value may be contestable, but whatever Charter values 
are, they are not Charter rights.  
Where a common law rule is challenged for non-compliance with the 
Charter, Charter value is more or less synonymous with Charter right. 
The use of the term “value” rather than “right” seems intended to signal 
the different context in which the Charter is deployed. Here, a Charter 
value means a Charter-right-impacted-by-a-common-law-rule. As 
Matthew Horner explains, section 32 confines the Charter’s application 
to emanations of the legislature and executive (including the 
administration); it does not encompass judicially produced common law. 
Moreover, a common law does not qualify as a “limit prescribed by law”, 
to the extent that “law” is understood as primary or subordinate 
legislation.  
Subjecting common law rules — whether in private law, evidence, 
criminal law or procedure — to the discipline of Charter “values” retains 
the content of Charter rights, but adapts the method of constitutional 
analysis to the specificity of the common law. The concept of a Charter 
“value” was invoked in R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,5 and the 
associated analytical structure developed in Hill v. Church of 
Scientology.
6
 The purpose was to enable courts qua neutral arbiters to 
review and revise potential Charter-infringing common law rules 
applicable as between private litigants, without unfairly imposing the 
section 1 justificatory burden on private parties. These considerations are 
not apposite to evaluating Charter compliance of discretionary decisions 
by a government actor.  
The precise definition of Charter values (or principles), and their 
relationship to Charter rights and freedoms in the context of discretion, 
remains unarticulated by the Court. The distinguishing feature of 
discretion is that it is not a fixed rule that must stand or fall according to 
                                                                                                             
5 [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.).  
6 [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.). 
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its constitutionality. Instead, a decision-maker may comply with the 
Charter simply by choosing to exercise discretion in a manner that does 
not violate it.  
My concern lies primarily with the use of Charter values in the 
sphere of administrative discretion. As with the common law, 
administrative discretion poses challenges for the conventional analytical 
framework for Charter adjudication, and it is upon this fact that 
jurisprudential debates pivot. I argue that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
current response lacks necessary rigour, clarity and suppleness. I 
commend the Court’s democratic impulse to “bring the Charter to the 
people” by enabling administrative decision-makers to consider the 
Charter in the course of executing their functions. But I worry that any 
salutary effect will be dissipated by an analytical method that purports to 
marry a simplified proportionality analysis with Dunsmuir’s deferential 
reasonableness review.
7
 In my view, this jurisprudential mashup respects 
neither the primacy nor priority of Charter rights and produces instead a 
Charter-lite approach to discretion.  
At root is a fundamental tension between the aforementioned 
democratic impulse and the counter-majoritarian dimension of a rights 
instrument like the Charter. Judges are entrusted with adjudicating the 
Charter not only because of their expertise, but also because of their 
independence from government. While many Charter challenges engage 
questions of redistribution that resist easy classification in terms of 
individual versus state, many Charter challenges do conform to type. The 
judiciary’s real and perceived detachment from the legislature and the 
executive matters to the legitimacy of rights adjudication when 
government actors are alleged to have breached the constitutional rights 
of individuals subject to their authority. Standard of review jurisprudence 
justifies deference by reference to democratic delegation and expertise. 
Independence plays no role in the assessment. Contemporary 
administrative law doctrine reserves no place for independence as a 
variable relevant to a determination of the need for judicial deference.  
The leading Supreme Court of Canada judgments that actually 
consider the Charter in the context of discretion are few and well 
discussed. These include Slaight Communications,
8
 Chamberlain,
9
 
                                                                                                             
7 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Dunsmuir”]. 
8 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.). 
9 Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.). 
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Multani
10
 and, of course, Doré.
11
 There is also an interesting counter-
jurisprudence of cases where the facts bring the Charter and discretion 
into contact, yet the Charter issue remains dormant in the judgment. 
These silences are also instructive about the complexity of the 
interaction. 
Consider Baker v. Canada.
12
 The appellant and interveners in that 
case argued that the negative assessment of a humanitarian and 
compassionate (“H & C”) application by a non-status migrant mother 
breached various Charter rights.
13
 One version of the section 7 argument 
was that the best interests of the child constituted a principle of 
fundamental justice, such that deportation of a parent violated section 7 if 
it was inimical to the best interests of the child. On behalf of the 
majority, L’Heureux-Dubé J. pre-empted a Charter analysis by remarking 
at the outset that because “the issues raised can be resolved under the 
principles of administrative law and statutory interpretation, I find it 
unnecessary to consider the various Charter issues raised by the appellant 
and the interveners who supported her position”.14 The Court then found 
that one of the officers displayed a reasonable apprehension of bias 
against Baker and that was sufficient to vitiate the decision.  
There is, indeed, no need to resort to the Charter on matters of 
procedural fairness like bias where the statute does not oust a common 
law analysis. But the Court in Baker did not limit itself to the procedural 
fairness of the decision. It proceeded to consider substantive aspects of 
the decision and, specifically, whether the immigration officer abused his 
discretion. It extended the standard of review analysis to discretion, and 
found that a deferential stance of “reasonableness simpliciter” was 
appropriate to reviewing the officer’s exercise of H & C discretion. 
Deference did not insulate decisions entirely, however, because 
“discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed 
in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of 
administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the 
principles of the Charter”.15 The Court does not explain whether a 
                                                                                                             
10 Multani, supra, note 2. 
11 Doré, supra, note 3. 
12 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 
2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 11 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
13 See Sharryn Aiken & Sheena Scott, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) and the Rights of Children” (2000) 15 J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 211. 
14 Baker, supra, note 12, at para. 11. 
15 Id., at para. 56. 
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principle of the Charter is the same as, or different from, a Charter right. 
If different, it is not apparent how it is different. But since Baker did not 
consider it necessary to address the Charter at all, these questions did not 
demand attention. 
The Court then found that best interests of children constituted a 
“central humanitarian and compassionate value in Canadian society”.16 
The immigration statute’s valorization of family reunification, the 
content of the Ministerial Guidelines relating to children and family, and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child’s explicit promotion of the 
“best interests of the child” each supported an interpretation of H & C 
that included attention to the best interests of the child. The Court did not 
address whether the best interests of the child was also a principle of the 
Charter.  
The majority did emphasize that the best interests of children was 
one relevant factor among many, and not dispositive of outcome: 
That is not to say that children’s best interests must always outweigh other 
considerations, or that there will not be other reasons for denying an H & C 
claim even when children’s interests are given this consideration. However, 
where the interests of children are minimized, in a manner inconsistent 
with Canada’s humanitarian and compassionate tradition and the 
Minister’s guidelines, the decision will be unreasonable.17 
Would this passage have looked the same had the best interests of the 
child been identified as a Charter principle? One could not answer 
the question without knowing more about whether a Charter principle is 
the same as a Charter right in content and in the mode of analysis that it 
triggers. The Court found that the officer had been “completely 
dismissive of the interests of Ms. Baker’s children”,18 but the judgment 
equivocates on whether the officer had no regard, or only insufficient 
regard, to the children’s interests. The question is now moot, because in 
its 2004 decision upholding corporal punishment of children, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the best interests of the child is not a principle 
of fundamental justice.
19
  
                                                                                                             
16 Id., at para. 67. 
17 Id., at para. 75. 
18 Id., at para. 65. 
19 According to the Court “‘the best interests of the child’ is a legal principle that carries 
great power in many contexts. However, it is not a principle of fundamental justice”: Canadian 
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 12 (S.C.C.).  
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Vexing questions about the application of the Charter to discretion 
also lurk beneath the surface of the Supreme Court’s 2002 Suresh20 
decision. The Court was confronted with a broad grant of ministerial 
discretion to deport non-citizens deemed to constitute threats to national 
security. The issue was whether the discretion authorized deportation to 
face a substantial risk of torture. The Supreme Court did not respond by 
cabining off deportation to torture as unconstitutional. Instead, it  
structured (or read down) the Minister’s discretion to do so: deportation 
to torture violates section 7 unless exceptional circumstances exist. The 
residual discretion to deport to torture then turns on the Minister’s 
opinion about whether exceptional circumstances connected to national 
security make the benefit to national security of deporting to torture 
exceed the harm to the person subject to torture. The Court leaves 
dangling the question of how this discretion should be reviewed by a 
court. In any individual case where the Minister proposes to exercise his 
or her discretion to deport a person to torture, how (if at all) does the 
Charter regulate that determination? Does a qualified prohibition on 
torture become a Charter “principle” or Charter “value” because it is 
nested in the exercise of individual discretion and, if so, what normative 
force does it exert? The Court coyly declines to explain when or why 
deporting a person to face torture might be a reasonable and/or 
constitutional exercise of discretion. Yet, the plausibility of such a 
scenario is crucial to legitimating the Court’s choice to reject an absolute 
prohibition on deportation to torture. The poverty of the Court’s analysis 
is made starker by the fact that both international law and jurisprudence 
under the European Court of Human Rights adopt the absolutist 
position.
21
  
Suresh also clarifies or reverses (depending on one’s perspective) an 
element of Baker. As noted above, one reading of the Court’s judgment 
in Baker is that the decision-maker abused his discretion by failing to 
give sufficient weight to a relevant factor, namely, the best interests of 
the child. In Suresh, however, the Supreme Court insisted that courts 
should not engage in re-weighing the factors that a discretionary decision- 
maker considers, as long as the relevant factors were considered. In an 
                                                                                                             
20 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]. 
21 The prohibition under international law is discussed in Suresh, id., at paras. 59-75. The 
ECHR’s prohibition was re-affirmed in Saadi v. Italy, no. 37201/06, judgment of February 28, 2008, 
online: <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85276>. 
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obscurely worded passage, the Court attempts to explain how the Court 
in Baker did not engage in re-weighing of evidence or relevant factors en 
route to the conclusion that the decision-maker exercised his discretion 
unreasonably.
22
 I return to this infra. 
More recently, in Divito v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness),
23
 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
Minister’s statutory discretion to refuse to consent to the transfer of a 
Canadian prisoner to a Canadian penitentiary, but the constitutionality of 
the specific exercise of discretion on the facts of the case was neither 
argued nor decided. 
III. DEVALUING CHARTER RIGHTS 
Doré represents the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent 
pronouncement on the relationship between the Charter and 
administrative discretion. It seems reasonable to ask whether Doré can 
resolve the dilemmas lurking in Baker, Suresh, Divito and in various 
lower court decisions. 
At issue in Doré was a decision by the Barreau du Québec’s 
disciplinary body to reprimand a lawyer for writing an intemperate letter 
to a judge complaining about that judge’s hostile and uncivil conduct in 
the courtroom. The lawyer objected that the decision breached his 
freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter because it 
penalized him for exercising that freedom through writing a rude letter to 
a judge. 
The disciplinary panel concluded that Mr. Doré violated art. 2.03 of 
the Code of Ethics of Advocates, which states that “The conduct of an 
advocate must bear the stamp of objectivity, moderation and dignity”. By 
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Doré’s argument was that 
the unconstitutionality did not reside in the provision of the Code of 
Ethics, but rather in its discretionary application to his specific case in a 
manner that breached his freedom of expression.  
Something else happened to freedom of expression on its way to 
Ottawa. It departed the Quebec Court of Appeal as a Charter right, but 
arrived at the Supreme Court of Canada as a Charter value. At the outset 
                                                                                                             
22 Suresh, id.; see also Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.). 
23 [2013] S.C.J. No. 47, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Divito”]. 
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of the Court’s analysis, Abella J. describes the appellant’s position as a 
violation of “the expressive rights protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter”.24 
Two paragraphs later, Abella J. reformulates the issue as follows: “It goes 
with saying that administrative decision-makers must act consistently 
with the values underlying the grant of discretion, including Charter 
values.”25 In the course of the judgment, she refers to the object of 
analysis as a Charter value over 30 times; the term “expressive rights” 
appears eight times in the judgment. Apart from when she quotes or 
paraphrases other authors or judgments, Abella J. eschews both “Charter 
right” and “freedom of expression” in relation to discretionary 
decisions.
26
  
While it would be pedantic to extract too much significance from 
semantic features of the judgment, the choice of language seems 
deliberate. Since freedom of expression is indisputably a protected 
Charter right, and sanctioning Doré for his letter undeniably imposed a 
limitation on his freedom of expression, it follows that the term “Charter 
value” rather than “Charter right” does not capture a difference in 
content. It must signify that freedom of expression is protected 
differently when it is limited by the exercise of discretion than when it is 
limited by statute or regulation. But what is the difference? Two 
possibilities spring to mind. First, the scope or depth of the protection 
afforded freedom of expression is diminished where it is limited through 
discretion. Alternatively, the quantity of protection does not vary, but the 
analytical framework by which the limitation is assessed is different 
where it arises in the context of discretion. 
Doré purports to convey the latter meaning. Justice Abella explains 
that “while a formulaic application of the Oakes test may not be 
workable in the context of an adjudicated decision, distilling its essence 
works the same justificatory muscles: balance and proportionality”.27 The 
goal, then, is that the exercise of Charter-infringing discretion is subject 
to a proportionality test that is tailored to the specificity and 
individualized nature of discretion. The essence of proportionality is that 
a decision should “[interfere] with the relevant Charter guarantee no 
                                                                                                             
24 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 22 (emphasis added). 
25 Id., at para. 24 (emphasis added). 
26 Id. Paragraph 6 is an exception, wherein Abella J. states that the relevant question is whether 
“the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right”. 
27 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 5. 
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more than is necessary given the statutory objectives”.28 Later in the 
judgment, Abella J. provides the roadmap:  
[The administrative decision-maker] balances the Charter values with 
the statutory objectives. In effecting this balancing, the decision-maker 
should first consider the statutory objectives. …  
Then the decision-maker should ask how the Charter value at issue 
will best be protected in view of the statutory objectives. This is at the 
core of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to 
balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with 
the statutory objectives.
29
 
This abridged proportionality analysis resembles the last step of the 
Oakes test insofar as it asks decision-makers to identify the competing 
interests (Charter values versus statutory objectives), and balance the two 
in determining how to exercise their discretion. One can speculate on 
whether this description is adequate to guide decision-makers, especially 
non-lawyers, about what they are expected to do.  
The task of integrating the Charter into the exercise of discretion is 
distinct from determining the standard of review applicable on judicial 
review of the discretionary decision. Dunsmuir winnowed down the 
range of issues attracting a non-deferential correctness standard of 
review to constitutionality, jurisdictional conflict between tribunals, 
questions of “central importance to the legal system as a whole” and 
outside the expertise of the decision-maker, and “true questions of 
jurisdiction”.30 Dunsmuir’s Supreme Court progeny have failed to 
identify a single question of central importance and expressed skepticism 
about the very existence of “true questions of jurisdiction”.31 Doré 
further shrinks the ambit of correctness review by preferring a deferential 
reasonableness standard for questions of constitutionality where they 
arise in the individual exercise of discretion. 
According to the Court, deference to discretionary decisions that 
engage the Charter is warranted because of the administrative decision-
maker’s relative expertise: 
                                                                                                             
28 Id., at para. 7. 
29 Id., at paras. 55-56. 
30 Dunsmuir, supra, note 7, at paras. 59, 60. 
31 Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Assn., [2011] 
S.C.J. No. 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.). 
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Deference is still justified on the basis of the decision-maker’s 
expertise and its proximity to the facts of the case. Even where Charter 
values are involved, the administrative decision-maker will generally 
be in the best position to consider the impact of the relevant Charter 
values on the specific facts of the case.
32
  
At this point, the Court turns to explicating why deferring to an 
administrative actor’s application of the proportionality-test-for-
discretionary-decisions will not dilute the level of protection that the 
Charter provides to individuals. The key claim is that judicial deference 
in administrative law is not so different from elements of judicial 
deference built into the Oakes test. According to the Court: 
… the role of judicial review for reasonableness aligns with the one 
applied in the Oakes context. As this Court recognized in RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 
para. 160, “courts must accord some leeway to the legislator” in the 
Charter balancing exercise, and the proportionality test will be satisfied 
if the measure “falls within a range of reasonable alternatives”. The 
same is true in the context of a review of an administrative decision for 
reasonableness, where decision-makers are entitled to a measure of 
deference so long as the decision, in the words of Dunsmuir, “falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes”.  
… Though this judicial review is conducted within the administrative 
framework, there is nonetheless conceptual harmony between a 
reasonableness review and the Oakes framework, since both contemplate 
giving a “margin of appreciation”, or deference, to administrative and 
legislative bodies in balancing Charter values against broader objectives.
33
 
The Court in Doré insists that its administrative law method will not 
diminish Charter protections compared to its rival from Multani, the 
Oakes test. The cogency of this position depends on two related 
functional claims: first, that integrating a proportionality test into 
discretionary decisions will do the same work as the proportionality test 
for common law doctrine, namely, adapt the Oakes test to a different 
                                                                                                             
32 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 54 (emphasis in original). See also Saskatchewan (Human 
Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] S.C.J. No. 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 (S.C.C.). The Court 
engages in a bifurcated analysis whereby the interpretation of s. 14 of the Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 and its constitutionality are evaluated on a correctness standard, 
and the findings of fact and the application of the hate speech provision to those facts attract a 
deferential “reasonableness” standard of review. 
33 Doré, id., at paras. 56, 57.  
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juridical context without diluting its potency. Second, a deferential 
standard of reasonableness will not insulate Charter violations from 
judicial rectification any more than does the Oakes test. 
The Court’s abbreviated account of proportionality analysis for 
administrative actors amounts to instructing them to name the relevant 
Charter “value”, identify the statutory objectives, and then balance them. 
Maybe three decades of section 1 analysis has persuaded the Court that the 
basic components of proportionality analysis are self-evident — perhaps 
even intuitive — so that if the Court keeps its instructions simple, any 
administrative decision-maker ought to be able to do it without the benefit 
of legal training or repeated exposure. The burgeoning legal scholarship 
and jurisprudence devoted to describing, defending, refining and critiquing 
proportionality might suggest undue optimism on that score. 
Indeed, even before one arrives at the proportionality analysis, one 
must figure out if a Charter “value” is engaged. Sometimes, the answer 
seems easy, as it was in Doré, thereby obviating the need for the Supreme 
Court of Canada to consider how a decision-maker ought to approach 
those steps in the Charter analysis that precede Oakes’ section 1 
proportionality test. At other times, it may be more obscure. In Divito, 
judges of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of 
Canada disagreed on whether the discretion to withhold consent to a 
citizen prisoner’s transfer to Canada engaged section 6(1) mobility rights. 
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the argument that refusing a 
prisoner transfer prima facie infringed the appellant’s Charter section 6 
right to enter Canada, yet went on to rule that the individual discretionary 
decision to consent to a prisoner transfer request must comply with Charter 
“values”. It is far from clear what the Charter “value” would be, and how it 
would differ from the Charter section 6 right to enter one’s country of 
citizenship. Presumably, an administrative actor must make a preliminary 
assessment of whether his or her decision engages a Charter “value”, 
bringing whatever insight his or her field expertise and proximity to the 
facts of the case offers in aid of this determination. Separating the inquiry 
into whether a Charter “value’” is at stake from the question of whether 
limitations on that “value” are justified also demands a certain level of 
sophistication. It is worth recalling that the decision-makers in Doré 
happened to be lawyers acting as a disciplinary body for the Barreau du 
Québec. Most administrative decision-makers who exercise discretion are 
not trained lawyers performing a formal adjudicative role.  
The Court asserts that an administrative decision-maker “exercising a 
discretionary power … has, by virtue of expertise and specialization, 
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particular familiarity with the competing considerations at play in weighing 
Charter values”.34 If this is true, then this expertise would presumably be 
equally pertinent and advantageous in a constitutional challenge to the 
administrative body’s constitutive statute, or legislative provisions granting 
discretion. After all, virtually all constitutional issues before an 
administrative decision-maker will arise in a concrete and specific factual 
context that engage the decision-maker’s expertise and specialization.  
Returning to Doré, there is no reason to think that the Barreau 
disciplinary body’s expertise and specialization would be any less salient 
had the Code of Ethics for Advocates explicitly proscribed oral or written 
communication that failed to display moderation or dignity. Yet, had the 
disciplinary body been called upon to determine the constitutionality of 
the discretion-conferring provision itself, that decision would have 
attracted no deference per Dunsmuir, and would have been assessed 
against a standard of review of correctness. What the Court does in Doré 
is take valid reasons for permitting an administrative decision-maker to 
consider the Charter, and repackage them into reasons for deferring to the 
result of that consideration. This either contradicts the logic of 
Dunsmuir’s retention of correctness for constitutional matters, or 
portends the erosion of correctness review for constitutionality.  
It is certainly the case that any competent administrative decision-
maker who exercises discretion should be acquainted with the objectives 
of the statute he or she administers, and will have acquired experience in 
determining facts, drawing inferences and balancing competing factors. If 
all that proportionality analysis demanded of decision-makers is that they 
stir “Charter value” into the mix of costs and benefits to be weighed en 
route to a decision, and then ask themselves whether it is necessary to limit 
the Charter protection in order to advance the statutory objectives, then 
one might suppose that administrative decision-makers’ expertise will 
serve them well enough.  
But that is not how proportionality operates under section 1 of the 
Charter. The normative uniqueness of Charter rights structures a more 
demanding inquiry. A proportionality analysis in the context of rights 
adjudication is not neutral as between rights and freedoms protected by 
the Charter and other interests, entitlements or “values”. To denominate 
an interest as a right is to recognize its normative primacy. As such, a 
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Charter right intrinsically “weighs” more (by virtue of being a right) than 
something called an interest, value or entitlement.  
A Charter right, once established, also asserts normative priority. 
A rights bearing individual need not justify the exercise of a Charter 
right; rather, the state must justify infringing it. The pre-eminence of 
Charter rights exemplifies what David Dyzenhaus describes as a rule of 
law culture of justification, as opposed to a “managerial culture”:  
[The culture of justification] is shaped by the assumption that the public 
authority bears the onus of justifying the limit on the right asserted, and 
it requires that the authority regard persons as bearer of rights, not as 
individuals who may or may not be accorded a privilege.
35
  
While the Court in Doré does instruct decision-makers to assess the 
necessity of limiting the Charter protection in order to achieve statutory 
objectives, the Court provides no practical advice about how to do that. 
Yet, the appraisal expected from administrative decision-makers cannot be 
made without attending to the existence and extent of conflict between 
advancing statutory objectives and protecting a Charter “value”, possible 
alternatives to conflict, the alternatives to resolving that conflict in the 
manner chosen, and even the importance of a given statutory objective in 
the context of the decision. Perhaps the Court in Doré intends to signal all 
of this when it remarks that “decision-makers … must remain conscious of 
the fundamental importance of Charter values in the analysis”.36 
There is another dimension to expertise that runs through the 
jurisprudence on judicial review, and it furnishes a slightly different 
rationale for deference. As Binnie J. commented in Dunsmuir, “different 
administrative decisions command different degrees of deference, 
depending on who is deciding what”.37 Sometimes, judges show 
deference to administrative decision-makers located at or near the top of 
what Binnie J., in Dunsmuir, dubbed the administrative food chain: 
A minister making decisions under the Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. E-23, to surrender a fugitive, for example, is said to be “at the extreme 
legislative end of the continuum of administrative decision-making” 
(Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631, at p. 659). 
On the other hand, a ministerial delegate making a deportation decision 
                                                                                                             
35 David Dyzenhaus, “Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of Justification” in Grant 
Huscroft, Bradley Miller & Grégoire Webber, eds., Proportionality and the Rule of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 234, at 251 (emphasis added).  
36 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 54. 
37 Dunsmuir, supra, note 7, at para. 135. 
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according to ministerial guidelines was accorded considerably less 
deference in Baker (where the “reasonableness simpliciter” standard 
was applied). The difference does not lie only in the judge’s view of the 
perceived immediacy of the defect in the administrative decision. In 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, a unanimous Court adopted the caution in the 
context of counter-terrorism measures that “[i]f the people are to accept 
the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by persons 
whom the people have elected and whom they can remove” (para. 33). 
… Then there are the Cabinet and Ministers of the Crown who make 
broad decisions of public policy such as testing cruise missiles, 
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, or policy 
decisions arising out of decisions of major administrative tribunals, as 
in Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 
S.C.R. 735, at p. 753, where the Court said: “The very nature of the 
body must be taken into account in assessing the technique of review 
which has been adopted by the Governor in Council.”38 
Similarly, in C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour),
39
 Bastarache J. 
(dissenting) stated that a statutory grant of discretion to a Minister “as 
opposed to an apolitical figure”40 signalled legislative preference for 
political accountability over legal accountability, and supported a posture 
of curial deference.
41
 Ministers tend to attract higher deference precisely 
because of their proximity to the legislative branch — if the legislator 
has delegated decision-making authority to a member of the executive 
who is also a legislator, perhaps it is because the decision calls upon 
those skills, perceptions and knowledge that a political actor possesses, 
and courts should defer accordingly.  
But in Charter litigation, proximity to the political branch of 
government pulls in the opposite direction — decisions by elected officials 
(legislators) are distrusted precisely because they might be inclined to trade 
off individual rights in the name of political gain. In other words, 
democratic legitimacy, political acumen and access to (presumably) expert 
staff may incline courts to display particular deference to Ministers in 
judicial review of discretion, but this translates awkwardly into a rationale 
for deference where the Charter is at issue. The fact that an administrative 
                                                                                                             
38 Dunsmuir, id., at para. 136. 
39 C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] S.C.J. No. 28, 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 
S.C.R. 539 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Retired Judges Case”].  
40 Id., at para. 18. 
41 See also Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 43, 2001 SCC 41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, at para. 58 (S.C.C.) (per Binnie J.). 
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decision-maker is also a high-ranking elected official is not a reason to 
defer to the balance he or she strikes between protection of individual 
rights and advancement of other objectives (statutory or otherwise). It may 
even be a reason not to defer.
41A
  
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Lake was not troubled by this tension. It counselled deference to the 
Minister’s determination of whether extradition would infringe a fugitive’s 
Charter rights.
42
 In my view, when a court refrains from scrutinizing a 
Minister’s Charter calculus on account of the Minister’s political status, it 
is not engaging in deference-as-respect, but rather deference-as-abdication. 
It is not the same careful and circumscribed exercise of restraint that a 
court might exhibit in assessing alternative options under the minimal 
impairment branch of the Oakes test; it is, rather, a casual and tacit 
declaration that courts ought not to interfere with ministerial power in 
certain politicized contexts, even where constitutionally protected human 
rights are at stake. Perhaps one could defend judicial abdication on some 
notion of justiciability or institutional legitimacy, but that does not alter  
the character of the act. In the interests of clarity, it would be preferable 
for the Court to provide a normative justification for deeming certain  
rights violations non-justiciable, rather than concealing it behind a 
“reasonableness” review. 
In Doré, the discretion was exercised by the Barreau du Québec, an 
independent, quasi-judicial tribunal composed of lawyers. Administrative 
decision-makers situated elsewhere on the executive spectrum between 
legislator and judiciary should not be presumed to possess comparable 
expertise or neutral disposition toward rights protection. As Ruth 
Sullivan notes of many “non-judicial” administrative actors: 
Their focus tends to be narrow and coloured by the concerns and 
possibly by the biases of their own professional culture. They may have 
particular interests to promote on behalf of their department or agency 
or they may have strong views respecting the groups or problems 
                                                                                                             
41A A parallel debate about the standard of review applicable to questions of law decided by a 
non-adjudicative body, including a minister, is unfolding in the Federal Court of Appeal. See, e.g., 
Georgia Strait Alliance v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) (sub nom. Canada (Minister 
of Fisheries and Oceans) v. David Suzuki Foundation), [2012] F.C.J. No. 157, 2012 FCA 40 
(F.C.A.); Kandola v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] F.C.J. No. 322, 
2014 FCA 85 (F.C.A.). 
42 Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] S.C.J. No. 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, at para. 34 
(S.C.C.), quoted in Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 50. 
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regulated by their legislation. This may put them into an adversarial 
position with other interested parties.
43
 
The foregoing does not suggest that decision-makers with authority to 
interpret law should not consider the Charter when exercising discretion. 
Their valuable “field expertise” may enhance the fact-finding process, the 
elaboration of the statutory scheme and the richness of the evidentiary 
foundation. Some individual decision-makers may also produce legally 
sophisticated and cogent Charter analyses. Many will not, either for lack of 
ability, time, resources or independence, or some combination thereof. There 
is simply no basis for a presumption that a decision-maker’s “field 
expertise”, which may contribute constructively to some aspects of a Charter 
analysis, equips the decision-maker to manage all aspects of a Charter 
analysis. On judicial review, judges should certainly pay attention to the 
reasons given by decision-makers exercising Charter-impacting discretion. 
After all, sometimes the reasons may be persuasive, and a judge should be as 
open to benefiting from a rigorous and compelling set of reasons in the same 
way he or she is open to persuasion from high-quality submissions by 
counsel, analyses by law clerks or opinions of fellow judges.  
In other words, the arguments in favour of Charter jurisdiction do not 
explain why deference is owed to their Charter outcomes. Nor do 
arguments about why courts should defer to the exercise of discretion on 
non-Charter matters automatically extend to those aspects of discretion that 
implicate the Charter. Yet Doré commits both of these errors. The slippage 
is exacerbated by the fact that the Court in Doré equips administrative 
decision-makers with a Charter-lite methodology that is approximate, vague 
and incomplete, starting with its problematic invocation of Charter 
“values”, and ending with its account of proportionality.  
The Court in Doré might plausibly have taken the view that the 
constraints facing administrative decision-makers generally make it 
unrealistic to expect a sophisticated and thorough Charter analysis (even 
if, in practice, a few administrative decision-makers will do it very well). 
Fair enough. The Court might also have adapted its Charter methodology 
to the context of discretion without sacrificing the priority and primacy 
of rights, just as the Court did for common law rules. But if the Charter-
lite approach to discretion lacks the rigour of a proper Charter analysis, it 
is not apparent why the outcomes it generates should merit a deferential 
                                                                                                             
43 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, ON: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2008), at 625. 
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posture on review, quite apart from the competence of the decision-
maker deploying it.
44
 
An obvious objection to curial deference is that it insulates the 
violation of fundamental rights and freedoms from judicial scrutiny and 
remedy. The words “I may have come to a different conclusion, but I 
cannot say that the tribunal was unreasonable in its decision” plays like 
an appropriate expression of judicial modesty in the 21st-century 
administrative state. The statement “I may have concluded that the 
applicant’s Charter rights were violated, but I cannot say the Minister 
was unreasonable in concluding that they were not” sounds a more 
discordant note. Perhaps the Court wished to deflect this concern with its 
account of how elements of curial deference are already built into the 
Oakes test. This would invite an inference that judicial review of the 
reasonableness of a discretionary discretion, and a direct application of 
the Oakes test, would produce comparable Charter protection. The routes 
might be different, but the destination is the same. 
So, for example, the Court finds symmetry in the reasonableness 
standard of judicial review and the “minimal impairment” inquiry in the 
Oakes test:  
This is where the role of judicial review for reasonableness aligns with 
the one applied in the Oakes context. As this Court recognized in RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 
para. 160, “courts must accord some leeway to the legislator” in the 
Charter balancing exercise, and the proportionality test will be satisfied 
if the measure “falls within a range of reasonable alternatives”. The 
same is true in the context of a review of an administrative decision for 
reasonableness, where decision-makers are entitled to a measure of 
deference so long as the decision, in the words of Dunsmuir, “falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes”.45  
                                                                                                             
44 The recent Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench decision in Wilson v. University of Calgary, 
[2014] A.J. No. 348, 2014 ABQB 190 (Alta. Q.B.) provides an interesting illustration of the 
difficulties. Anti-abortion students challenged limitations placed on their public display before the 
university disciplinary bodies as a violation of their Charter-protected freedom of expression. The 
decision-maker (an academic without legal training) rejected the argument in three sentences, and 
the reviewing court spent almost four pages explaining why the Charter analysis was unreasonable, 
per Doré. Query whether the expectation that the decision-maker’s specialization and experience in 
student discipline equipped him for the task of balancing Charter rights. A reasonableness review 
proceeds as if the decision-maker was entirely capable of engaging in the kind of analysis that the 
Court found he unreasonably failed to do, but the case provides ample basis for concluding that he 
was not and should not have been expected to do so. 
45 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 56. 
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In the next paragraph, Abella J. reiterates her view of “conceptual 
harmony” between a reasonableness review and the Oakes test:  
As LeBel J. noted in Multani, when a court is faced with reviewing an 
administrative decision that implicates Charter rights, “[t]he issue 
becomes one of proportionality” (para. 155), and calls for integrating 
the spirit of s. 1 into judicial review. Though this judicial review is 
conducted within the administrative framework, there is nonetheless 
conceptual harmony between a reasonableness review and the Oakes 
framework, since both contemplate giving a “margin of appreciation”, 
or deference, to administrative and legislative bodies in balancing 
Charter values against broader objectives.
46
  
The scope, meaning and application of deference by the Supreme 
Court in the context of “minimal impairment” are matters of considerable 
complexity and nuance.
47
 In any event, I concur with David Mullan’s 
skepticism that administrative law deference and “margin of 
appreciation” in the context of minimal impairment share as much in 
common as Abella J. implies. As Mullan comments:  
[E]ven when translated to the world of judicial review of administrative 
action, that limited concession [in the Oakes test] to a margin of 
appreciation in the context of a justification of a prima facie violation 
of a protected right or freedom seems far removed from the respect for 
agency choice found in the normal application of an unreasonableness 
standard of review.
48
  
Mullan’s point appears to be that the deference contemplated by 
judicial review on a standard of reasonableness is qualitatively different 
and quantitatively broader than that which is contemplated under the 
narrower and more confined “leeway” accorded to the legislator under 
the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test. After all, the premise of 
deference in administrative law is that the choice of the legislator to 
confer authority on the executive (rather than directly on the courts) 
signals a preference for the specialization, field expertise and possible 
efficiency in fulfilling the legislator’s mandate that an administrative 
body (as opposed to a court) can bring to the job. The Charter tilts in the 
opposite direction. The adjudication of rights and the judicial authority to 
                                                                                                             
46 Doré, id., at para. 57. 
47 See Richard Moon, “Justified Limits on Expression: The Collapse of the General 
Approach to Limits on Charter Rights” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 335, at 358-65. 
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invalidate legislation or otherwise remedy Charter-infringing government 
action are predicated on the superior institutional competence, expertise 
and independence that courts can bring to that job (as opposed to the 
legislator or the executive). The limited space allocated to a “margin of 
appreciation” for legislative choice does not make deference a defining 
feature of the Charter’s analytical framework. 
Paul Daly also conducts an extended, incisive, comparative analysis 
of each step of the Oakes test and the elements of reasonableness review 
in administrative law. He tests the hypothesis that proportionality (using 
Oakes as the paradigm) is broadly reconcilable with reasonableness 
review in administrative law. He concludes that it is not: Oakes’ 
proportionality test is a more intrusive standard of review.
49
 
The structural asymmetry between deference in administrative law 
and deference in Charter analysis is visible at close range when applied 
to the exercise of discretion. As noted above, the primacy accorded to 
Charter rights means that Charter rights matter more than other interests, 
claims or entitlements. Charter rights weigh more. That is why, under the 
Oakes test, the party seeking to limit a Charter right bears a heavy burden 
of justification. The stages of the test are designed to ensure that limiting 
a right serves important objectives, actually advances those objectives 
and limits the right no more than required to achieve the objective. Only 
after clearing each of those hurdles does one arrive at the ultimate 
balancing of the last step, in which the failure to accord sufficient weight 
to the Charter right may still yield the conclusion that the government 
has not discharged its burden. 
Meanwhile, the Court’s standard of review jurisprudence shows no 
sign (yet) of nuancing the position that deferential review of discretion 
precludes re-weighing the factors that go into the decision. Recall that 
while the Court in Baker appeared to fault the decision-maker for failing 
to give appropriate weight to the best interests of affected children, the 
Supreme Court in Suresh insisted that this perception was mistaken: 
It follows that the weighing of relevant factors is not the function of 
a court reviewing the exercise of ministerial discretion … . 
The Court’s recent decision in Baker, supra, did not depart from this 
view.  
                                                                                                             
49 Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ch. 5. 
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… To the extent this Court reviewed the Minister’s discretion in that 
case, its decision was based on the ministerial delegate’s failure to 
comply with self-imposed ministerial guidelines, as reflected in the 
objectives of the Act, international treaty obligations and, most 
importantly, a set of published instructions to immigration officers.  
The passages in Baker referring to the “weight” of particular 
factors … must be read in this context. It is the Minister who was 
obliged to give proper weight to the relevant factors and none other. 
Baker does not authorize courts reviewing decisions on the 
discretionary end of the spectrum to engage in a new weighing 
process, but draws on an established line of cases concerning the 
failure of ministerial delegates to consider and weigh implied 
limitations and/or patently relevant factors … .50 
The Court’s concern with re-weighing discretionary judgment is that 
it will erode curial deference by opening up discretionary decisions to 
excessive judicial intervention. The Court has subsequently reiterated its 
opposition to re-weighing evidence, inferences or factors when engaging 
in a reasonableness review of discretion.
51
  
Doré does not explicitly depart from this admonition against re-
weighing, but one might contend that it implies a softening of the 
position. After describing the technique of incorporating Charter values 
into the reasonableness inquiry, Abella J. states that “[i]f in exercising its 
statutory discretion, the decision-maker has properly balanced the 
relevant Charter value with the statutory objectives, the decision will be 
found to be reasonable”.52 Perhaps the modifier “proper” in front of 
balancing is intended to convey something about the relative weight 
accorded to a Charter “value” compared to statutory objectives. Absent 
more explicit language, however, this remark seems too oblique to 
displace the emphatic insistence in post-Dunsmuir jurisprudence that 
reasonableness review of discretion does not permit re-weighing.  
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Doré’s breezy methodology 
may sometimes but not always or necessarily deliver the same level of 
Charter protection as would a more meticulous Charter analysis. Cracks 
at several points expose its structural weakness. First, the term Charter 
“value” rather than “right” obfuscates the crucial question that should lie 
                                                                                                             
50 Suresh, supra, note 20, at paras. 34-37 (emphasis in original). 
51 See, e.g., Khosa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenhip and Immigration), [2009] S.C.J.  
No. 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.). 
52 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 58. 
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at the core of the inquiry, which is whether the decision engages a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom, and whether that right or 
freedom is equally protected from infringement by discretion as by law. 
Second, the proportionality analysis that the Court commends to 
administrative decision-makers does not acknowledge or respect the 
primacy or the priority of constitutionally protected rights. As such, 
administrative decision-makers are not instructed to treat a Charter right 
or freedom (if that is what a “value” is) as intrinsically weightier than 
other types of interests or considerations. 
This Charter-lite methodology would not be fatal, if courts on 
judicial review were authorized to measure the outcomes reached by the 
administrative decision-maker against a substantive metric that did value 
Charter rights and freedoms appropriately. But according to Doré, a 
reviewing court must assess the result of the proportionality analysis on a 
standard of reasonableness, and must not re-evaluate the weight accorded 
to the Charter “value” as against competing interests or objectives. To  
re-weigh would undermine fidelity to the principle of curial deference in 
administrative law. Despite Doré’s promise, it seems beyond 
peradventure that an administrative actor exercising discretion will form 
the view that the Charter “value” is less important than the objectives 
sought by its infringement, and a reviewing court will not intervene 
because it is not supposed to re-weigh the factors, even if it might have 
given greater weight to the harm inflicted by the Charter violation.  
David Mullan is surely right to observe that not all Charter violations 
are equal; some rights infringements are graver than others. Sanctioning 
a lawyer for an impudent letter and deporting a person to torture may 
both infringe the Charter, but are orders of magnitude apart in impact. 
Yet, Doré discloses no sensitivity to this spectrum and its implications 
for judicial review. Nothing in the judgment offers a doctrinal basis for 
claiming that a ministerial decision to deport a person to torture demands 
something different from a reviewing court than a decision to sanction a 
lawyer for writing a vitriolic letter to a judge. When administrative law’s 
logic of curial deference collides with the Charter’s logic of rights 
protection, Doré sides with deference.  
One might agree that Doré fails to take Charter rights seriously (or 
seriously enough) in the context of discretion, but still maintain that the 
approach to Charter adjudication (including the Oakes test) is poorly 
suited to the exercise of discretion. Perhaps a tailored proportionality test 
is as necessary for discretion as it is for common law rules. Designing a 
thorough and comprehensive proportionality test for discretion lies 
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beyond the scope of this paper, but I have elsewhere attempted to 
stipulate basic desiderata that the logic of proportionality requires of a 
decision that engages a Charter right:
53
  
a. Recognition of the normative primacy and priority of the Charter 
right(s);  
b. Constitutionally and statutorily valid objectives sought to be 
achieved by the exercise of discretion in the individual case;  
c. An evidentiary basis beyond mere speculation for material facts, 
and inferences from those facts; 
d. Where protection of a Charter right may conflict with attainment of 
a valid objective, the reasons should show that the conflict is 
genuine and the choice to infringe a Charter right is necessary in the 
individual case.  
1. A conflict is not genuine where the specific rights 
infringement does not demonstrably advance attainment 
of the objective in relation to that case. 
2. A conflict is not genuine where the objective can be 
advanced without violating a Charter right or by a less 
severe intrusion on that right. 
3. A conflict is not necessary when a reasonable 
compromise in attainment of the objective in the 
individual case can minimize or avoid a rights violation.
54
  
These criteria may be imperfect, but they attempt to capture minimum 
and necessary elements of a rights analysis that are flexible enough to 
adapt to the context of discretion without sacrificing the primacy and 
priority of Charter rights. In the face of Doré’s slack methodology, it seems 
important to articulate and aspire to elements of sound Charter reasoning. 
And if applying these criteria seems to ask too much from many 
administrative decision-makers, then that would seem to weaken the case 
for judicial deference to their Charter-impacting decisions. 
                                                                                                             
53 The author was counsel to the intervener Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights in 
Divito, supra, note 23. The intervener’s factum proposed an adaptation of a Charter analysis to the 
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What is at stake if Doré’s Charter-lite does not deliver individuals 
seeking rights protection to the same destination as a more exacting 
Charter analysis? Writing in dissent in Cooper, McLachlin J. (as she then 
was) makes a strong plea for broad authority among administrative 
decision-makers to consider Charter issues that come before them, and 
her view ultimately prevailed in R. v. Conway: 
[E]very tribunal charged with the duty of deciding issues of law has the 
concomitant power to do so. The fact that the question of law concerns 
the effect of the Charter does not change the matter. The Charter is not 
some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the superior courts may 
touch. The Charter belongs to the people. All law and law-makers that 
touch the people must conform to it. Tribunals and commissions 
charged with deciding legal issues are no exception. Many more 
citizens have their rights determined by these tribunals than by the 
courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then it 
must find its expression in the decisions of these tribunals.
55
  
To fulfil the promise of bringing the Charter to the people, it matters 
not only that administrative decision-makers consider the Charter; it 
matters how they consider it, and it matters even more how carefully a 
reviewing court supervises their decisions. Instructing administrative 
decision-makers to apply Doré’s Charter-lite proportionality test creates 
the appearance that “all law and law-makers that touch the Charter 
conform to it”. But if judicial review applies a deferential standard that 
does not inquire into weight, it disables itself from discerning superficial 
appearance from genuine conformity. One might question whether “the 
people” benefit from enabling administrative actors to incorporate the 
Charter into discretionary decision-making if the methodology tilts 
toward undervaluing the Charter and the results are insulated from 
meaningful scrutiny.  
From a governance perspective, the divergence between the Doré 
model and a more conventional Charter analysis raises important 
questions. Governments select from a range of options about how to 
effectuate policy choices through law. Doré embodies the salutary 
aspiration that all branches and institutions of government share a 
primary commitment to the rule of law (including the Constitution) and 
manifest that fidelity in the performance of their assigned mandates.  
                                                                                                             
55 Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] S.C.J. No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, 
at para. 70 (S.C.C.), quoted in R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765, at para. 77 
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But consider as well the possibility of a government that regards the 
Charter and the judiciary as sources of undemocratic, elitist constraint on 
the exercise of public power by elected representatives for the benefit of 
the people who voted for them. Such a government might wish to 
maximize the ambit of executive power and minimize the risk of being 
thwarted by judicial review including (or especially) where Charter rights 
and freedoms are at stake. Such a government could proceed by 
articulating rules that explicitly or by necessary implication limit a Charter 
right. Or, it could grant an administrative actor discretion to act, and then 
structure and confine potentially Charter-infringing discretion by 
stipulating the purpose of the discretion and relevant factors to guide the 
decision. In either case, the government must be prepared to defend the 
constitutionality of those rights-limiting provisions under the Oakes test. 
But such a government, reading Doré, might cynically and reasonably 
conclude that conferring broad, open-ended and non-specific discretion 
(especially on a Minister) will maximize the latitude available to limit 
Charter rights and minimize the likelihood and intensity of judicial 
oversight. In these instances, a reviewing court will restrict itself to asking 
whether the decision-maker balanced the relevant Charter “value” against 
competing factors. Following Doré, a reviewing court will eschew second-
guessing the quality of the balancing exercise. The upshot is that the more 
the state governs through discretion, the less accountable it will be for 
Charter violations that happen within that zone of discretion. 
Reading Doré as a lesson about governance is disquieting. All other 
things being equal, the rule of law is better served if law-makers are 
encouraged to communicate through transparent and defined grants of 
legal authority, even when governing through discretion. This is 
particularly the case for powers that carry the potential to infringe 
constitutionally protected rights. A doctrine that creates incentives to 
govern opaquely in order to minimize legal accountability (especially for 
rights violations) undermines the aspirations of the rule of law.  
IV.CONCLUSION: TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A perennial challenge and frustration of administrative law is the 
near-impossibility of tailoring a one-size-fits-all doctrine of judicial 
review that will work equally well across the myriad domains of the 
administration. The range of activities, actors and impacts that doctrine 
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purports to address is simply too vast and diverse. One must add to this 
the range of pathologies that differentially preoccupy critics and 
commentators of the Court’s standard of review jurisprudence. For some, 
the dominant threat is a retrograde or inexpert judiciary thwarting the 
expertise of administrative actors. For others, it is the systematic 
disregard of vulnerable individuals’ interests, rights and entitlements by 
inept, under-resourced or politicized bureaucrats. Over-judicialization of 
the administration may paralyze it. Inadequate attention to legality may 
produce injustice. The problem, of course, is that these and other 
pathologies exist simultaneously across the spectrum of the 
administrative state. A doctrine animated by ameliorating one pathology 
risks exacerbating another. 
What does this mean for the application of the Charter in the context 
of administrative discretion? David Mullan captures an important 
intuition about the risks of overweaning judicial scrutiny. In a passage 
quoted with approval by Abella J. in Doré, he states: 
If correctness review becomes the order of the day in all Charter 
contexts, including the determination of factual issues and the 
application of the law to those facts, then what in effect can occur is 
that the courts will perforce assume the role of a de novo appellate body 
from all tribunals the task of which is to make decisions that of 
necessity have an impact on Charter rights and freedoms: Review 
Boards, Parole Boards, prison disciplinary tribunals, child welfare 
authorities, and the like. Whether that kind of judicial micro-managing 
of aspects of the administrative process should take place is a highly 
problematic question. [Emphasis added; p. 145.]
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Yet Mullan is also alert to the dangers of judicial abdication. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada recently upheld the security 
certificate issued against Mohamed Harkat, which opens the possibility 
that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration will exercise his 
discretion to order Harkat’s deportation to Algeria, even if Harkat faces a 
substantial risk of torture there.
57
 In another passage from the same 
article — not quoted by Abella J. in Doré — Mullan qualifies his earlier 
caution about judicial micro-management:  
                                                                                                             
56 Doré, supra, note 3, at para. 51, quoting David Mullan, “Administrative Tribunals and Judicial 
Review of Charter Issues after Multani” (2006) 21 N.J.C.L. 127, at 145 [hereinafter “Mullan 2006”]. 
57 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] S.C.J. No. 37, 2014 
SCC 37 (S.C.C.). 
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It may also be the case that there are situations where the 
institutional frame-work that forms the context for the judicial review 
application is one where there can be no reasonable assurance that 
the decision-maker can or will give the Charter rights and freedoms 
at stake their appropriate weighting. In those instances, the Court may 
be completely justified in correctness review. Thus, for example, in 
the context of Suresh and Ahani, where the decision-maker’s primary 
concerns are the security interests of Canada, the expectation that 
Charter rights and freedoms will be evaluated properly may simply 
not be justified at least in the absence of some internal, independent 
check. If so, then correctness review may be necessary if, indeed, 
Charter rights and freedoms are not to be devalued.
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Mullan’s two examples usefully orient one toward identifying 
ingredients in a more refined account of how courts on judicial review 
ought to assess the legality of discretionary decisions that affect Charter 
rights. Recall that the logic of deference animating standard of review 
analysis derives from the presumed expertise of administrative decision-
makers in relation to their statutory mandate, in tandem with the 
legislator’s choice to confer authority on emanations of the executive 
(agencies, boards, tribunals and bureaucrats) rather than on the judiciary. 
Unlike administrative law doctrine concerning the requirements of 
procedural fairness, standard of review jurisprudence is formally 
indifferent to the interest at stake in the decision. Nor does standard of 
review analysis attend to the independence of the decision-maker. Both 
of these must matter when constitutional rights are at issue, for these 
considerations form part of the logic animating a judicially enforceable 
human rights instrument.  
Therefore, I suggest that the following considerations (which do not 
figure in Dunsmuir, Pushpanathan,
59
 Multani or Doré) should guide a court 
that is called upon to review Charter-impacting exercises of discretion: 
(1) The magnitude of the rights violation. The more serious the rights 
violation, the greater the importance of attending closely to the weight 
ascribed to the Charter right against countervailing considerations.  
                                                                                                             
58 Mullan 2006, supra, note 56, at 148, n. 75. 
59 Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.). 
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(2) The independence of the decision-maker from political influence. 
The closer the relationship between the decision-maker and the 
legislator, the less reason to defer to the balancing of individual 
rights against majoritarian interests.  
(3) Where no or inadequate reasons are provided for the exercise of 
discretion that infringes a Charter right, curial deference neither 
requires nor authorizes retrofitting reasons to support the result 
reached by the administrative decision-maker. 
(4) The extent to which the discretion is structured and guided through 
constitutionally valid legislation, regulation or “soft law”. Where the 
exercise of discretion will routinely and predictably limit Charter 
rights (e.g., in civil or criminal commitment, parole, immigration 
detention, child apprehension, extradition, etc.), legislators can and 
should stipulate the purposes for which the discretion is granted and 
the factors relevant to the exercise of discretion. If these provisions 
withstand an ordinary Charter challenge (including the section 1 
Oakes test), then the individual exercise of discretion within those 
demarcated constitutional boundaries should benefit from greater 
deference than exercises of broad, general and unstructured 
discretion. If the legislator declines to structure the discretion, then 
the individual exercise of discretion warrants no deference.60 
Whether these considerations travel under the rubric of 
reasonableness, correctness or some other label matters less than that they 
receive proper and explicit attention. If Multani’s approach was too blunt 
in its importation of the Oakes test and a correctness standard of review, 
then Doré repeats the same error in the opposite direction with its 
combination of Charter-lite proportionality and reasonableness review. 
Following Multani, David Mullan correctly (and reasonably) concluded 
that there is “room for deference to the discretionary judgments of 
statutory authorities exercising powers that have the potential to affect 
Charter rights and freedoms”, but in order to prevent devaluation of those 
rights and freedoms “there should be recognition that the framework 
within which deference operates will often, perhaps invariably need to be 
different than in the case of judicial review of administrative action that 
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defining the scope of discretion in legislation. 
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does not affect Charter rights and freedoms”.61 Unfortunately and 
ironically, Doré invites the risk of devaluing the Charter through the 
invocation of Charter values and accompanying methodology. Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) correctly observed that many more people 
have their rights determined by administrative decision-makers than by 
courts. The quality of Charter protection they receive should not depend on 
who makes the determination.  
                                                                                                             
61 Mullan 2006, supra, note 56, at 149. 
 
